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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
might reasonably be assumed that the Municipal Home Rule Powers
Act gives municipal ordinances a strong presumption of validity, the
battery of tests applied by the court suggest otherwise. If the court
chooses, it may limit the Act by attacking its flanks, using the methods
outlined above on a case-by-case basis. In the course of defining the
Act's outer boundaries, Forte Towers will be cited and analyzed again
and again by courts and litigants. The initiative now clearly lies with
the cities. They may take heart in the fact that a previously un-
sympathetic court at least did not expressly discourage municipalities
from flexing their new muscles.
DAVID K. MILLER
Uniform Commercial Code-SEcURED TRANSACTIONS-PRIORITY OF PER-
FECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY OVER CON-
FLICTING PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST NOT TIMELY FILED IS
LIMITED TO DEBTOR'S EQUITY IN COLLATERAL.-International Harvest-
er Credit Corp. v. American National Bank, 296 So. 2d 32 (Fla. 1974).
On April 8, 1969, Machek Farms, Inc. executed an installment
note and security agreement with the American National Bank. The
agreement encumbered all property thereafter acquired by Machek.
Two days later the bank filed a financing statement concerning the
agreement. Under a retail installment contract dated April 25, 1969,
Machek purchased and received from the Florida Truck and Tractor
Company (FTT) two items of farm equipment, each having a pur-
chase price of slightly less than $2,000. FTT filed no financing state-
ment concerning this transaction. On August 8, 1969, under a similar
contract with the same company, Machek purchased and received
seven more items of farm equipment. Four of those items had a
purchase price below $2,500; three had a price in excess of that figure.
FTT assigned the August 8 contract to the International Harvester
Credit Corporation (IHCC), which filed a financing statement on
September 3, 1969. Machek subsequently defaulted on payment of
the installment note and on both contracts made with FTT. After
Machek voluntarily returned the equipment purchased under both
reversing them; if future cases follow the pattern of Forte Towers, municipalities will
have less difficulty establishing new powers under the Act than defending the means
chosen, to exercise those powers.
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contracts to FTT, the bank brought a replevin suit against FTT and
IHCC in the Circuit Court of Putnam County seeking possession of
all the equipment.,
For guidance as to the relative priority of the litigants' interest
in the equipment, two questions were certified to the First District
Court of Appeal,2 and ultimately to the Florida Supreme Court.'
Both questions involved construction of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) as adopted in chapter 679, Florida Statutes.
The first question concerned section 679.302(l)(c), Florida Statutes,
which provides that a purchase money financier is not required to
file a financing statement to perfect his interest "in farm equipment
having a purchase price" under $2,500. 4 The courts were asked to
determine whether "purchase price" referred to the total purchase
price of several items sold under a single contract, or the purchase
price of each individual item of equipment included in that contract.
I. American Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726, 727
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
2. Id. The certified questions were:
[I.] Under Florida Statute 679.302(l)(c), must a seller of farm equipment file a
financing statement to perfect his security interest in farm equipment sold under
one contract when the purchase price of each item is less than $2,500.00, but the
total amount of the contract for all items exceeds $2,500.00?
[II.] Under Florida Statute 679.312(4) and (5), does a party with a security interest
in after acquired property take priority over a party with a purchase money
security interest which was not perfected within ten days after the debtor took
possession of the collateral?
Id. at 727, 729. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-302 (1962 version) (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 679.302 (1973)) and UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-312(4), (5) (1962 version)
(codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 679.312(4), (5) (1973)) were before the court as matters of
first impression. FLA. STAT. § 679.302 provides in pertinent part:
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests except
the following:
(c) A purchase money security interest in farm equipment having a -purchase
price not in excess of $2,500; but filing is required for a fixture under § 679.313.
FLA. STAT. §§ 679.312(4), (5) provide in pertinent part:
(4) A purchase money security interest in collateral other than inventory
has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral if the pur-
chase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives posses-
sion of the collateral or within ten days thereafter.
(5) In all cases not governed by the rules stated in this section (including
cases of purchase money security interests which do not qualify for the special
priorities set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of this section) priority between
conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows:
(a) In the order of filing if both are perfected by filing . ..
3. International Harvester Credit Corp. v. American Nat'l Bank, 296 So. 2d 32,
33 (Fla. 1974).
4. See note 2 supra.
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The second question involved the system, set out in sections
679.312(4) and (5), Florida Statutes, for determining priorities among
conflicting security interests. The general rule of section 679.312(5) is
that where there are two or more conflicting security interests in the
same collateral, priority goes to the financier who first files or perfects
his security interest. Section 679.312(4), an exception to this rule,
enables a purchase money financier to obtain priority over a pre-
viously perfected security interest in the debtor's after-acquired pro-
perty by filing his financing statement within 10 days after the debtor
receives possession of the collateral.5 The courts were asked to deter-
mine the relative priority of an interest held by a purchase money
financier who had failed to file within the 10-day grace period of
section 679.312(4), and a previously perfected security interest in after-
acquired property.
The supreme court's answer to Question I broadened the scope
of the farm equipment exception to the "file to perfect" rule, an ex-
ception that has been narrowed by many state legislatures and deleted
by the framers of the UCC in the 1972 revision.6 The supreme court's
response to Question II seems to contradict the unambiguous wording
of the UCC and stands alone against the unanimous construction of
identical statutes in other jurisdictions. 7
QUESTION I
Noting that a purchase money security interest can be taken in all
the collateral described in a contract and need not be discharged as to
any item of collateral until the entire debt is paid, the district court
reasoned that the "purchase price" in section 679.302(l)(c) referred
to the total contract price." The district court held that if the total
contract price exceeded $2,500, a financing statement had to be filed in
order to perfect a security interest in farm equipment." The supreme
court, however, decided that the purchase price of each individual
item controlled, and that as long as each item cost less than $2,500,
recordation was not required for perfection regardless of the com-
bined price of the items sold under a contract. The court based its
holding on the "consistently... singular"'10 syntax of the section and
5. Id.
6. See notes 14-15 and accompanying text infra.
7. See note 26 infra.
8. 269 So. 2d at 728-29.
9. Id. at 729.
10. 296 So. 2d at 33. The court cited the phrases "a purchase price" and "a fix-
ture" as examples of the singular context of § 679.302(l)(c).
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on a presumption that the legislature intended to require filing only
in the case of farm items "substantial enough to cost $2,500.""
Although "purchase price" in section 679.302(1)(c) can be reason-
ably interpreted to refer to the price of one item or to the total price
of all items under a single contract, the supreme court's interpretation
seems inconsistent with other sections of the UCC. Section 671.102(5)(a)
states that for purposes of the Code, "words in the singular number in-
clude the plural . . . ." Definitional section 679.109 declares that
"[g]oods are ... equipment if they are used. . . ." (emphasis added).
These sections suggest that the word "equipment" in section 679.302
(1)(c) refers to one item or many,12 and therefore recordation is re-
quired for perfection of a purchase money security interest in several
items of farm equipment sold for a collective purchase price in excess
of $2,500. Unfortunately, nothing in the official or Florida comments
to the UCC clarifies the meaning of the subsection or serves as a clue
to the intentions of the framers of the Code or the Florida legislature,
and the issue apparently has not been considered by courts in other
jurisdictions.' s
The supreme court disposed of Question I in a brief two paragraph
discussion. This summary treatment may prove regrettable, since the
court neither considered the effect of its negative answer upon Florida's
farmers, nor took notice of the overall disrepute into which section
679.302(l)(c) has fallen. The 1972 version of the UCC, which Florida
has not adopted, does not include the farm equipment exception
because the drafters found that the exception had caused many lenders
to refuse to accept farm equipment as collateral.1 4 Many states, in
11. 296 So. 2d at 34.
12. See also WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 768 (1971), which
defines the noun "equipment" as "physical resources . . . implements . . . assets . . .
supplies" and as "a piece of such equipment."
13. See American Nat'l Bank v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 269 So. 2d 726,
728 (1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
14. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, NAT'L CONF. OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE
LAWS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1972 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS AND APPENDIX
SHOWING 1972 CHANGES 727. Henson states that the exception has inhibited credit to
farmers because
a lender, such as a local bank, cannot be assured that an item of equipment
proposed as collateral is free of liens or has not been put together by a number
of components all of which are subject to automatically perfected purchase money
security interests.
R. HENSON, SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 4-33, at 69
(1973).
Another commentator observes that the exemption
stands in the books as a foolish monument of a foolish privilege and as a trap
for the unwary. What is worse it has hurt the farmer by limiting his use of equip-
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adopting the 1962 version of the UCC, narrowed the farm equipment
exception by reducing the $2,500 figure to $1,000 or less. 15
The supreme court's answer to Question I defeats uniformity of
the Code in that it broadens the scope of section 697.302(1)(c) in the
face of widespread elimination and restriction of that clause in other
states. In addition, the court's action may result in decreased availabili-
ty of credit for farmers in this state. A possible remedy for this situa-
tion would be the adoption of the 1972 version of section 9-302. Such
legislative action would eliminate altogether the farm equipment ex-
ception to the filing requirement. Deleting the exception would re-
quire sellers of farm equipment to file in order to perfect, thus pro-
viding notice to lenders and making farm equipment more acceptable
as collateral for loans.
QUESTION II
The August 8, 1969 contract between FTT and Machek, which was
subsequently assigned to IHCC, included three items of farm equip-
ment individually priced in excess of $2,500. IHCC's interest in this
equipment was a purchase money security interest. Under section
679.312(4) that interest was entitled to priority over conflicting securi-
ty interests in the same collateral if perfected within 10 days after the
debtor received possession of the collateral. Since IHCC did not perfect
its security interest until 26 days after Machek received possession of
the collateral, the district court concluded that section 679.312(4) was
not applicable and therefore the relative priority of the litigants' in-
terests was to be decided according to the instructions in section
679.312(5).16 That section provides that, with the exception of sub-
section (4) and other special rules not applicable here, priority be-
tween conflicting security interests perfected by filing is determined
by the order of filing.17 Since the bank perfected its security interest
in all Machek's after-acquired property by filing its financing state-
ment five months before IHCC filed, the district court held that the
bank had priority over IHCC's interest.'8
ment as collateral for a farm loan, because potential secured lenders are alert
to the possibility of the existence of an unfiled purchase money security interest
in the same piece of equipment which would have priority over them.
Hawkland, The Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the U.C.C.-Part 1: Financing
the Farmer, 76 Com. L.J. 416, 417 (1971).
15. Twelve states reduced the $2,500 figure to $500, one state to $1,000 and one
to $250. Two states omitted the exemption altogether. See UNIFORM LAws ANNOTATED, 3
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE at 139-49 (1968).
16. 269 So. 2d at 730.
17. See note 2 supra.
18. 269 So. 2d at 731.
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Acting Chief Judge Rawls, dissenting in part, objected to the re-
suit the majority had reached as "legal larceny"' 9 of property right-
fully belonging to FTT and IHCC. Judge Rawls viewed the bank's
priority interest in Machek's after-acquired property as limited to
the property which Machek owned free and clear of "vendor's liens";
in other words, to the debtor's equity in the property."0
By adopting Judge Rawls' view, the Florida Supreme Court
severely qualified, if it did not totally reject, the district court's
affirmative answer to Question II. The supreme court did not question
section 679.312(5)'s unequivocal grant of priority to the earlier
creditor's perfected security interest in after-acquired property where
the subsequent creditor fails to meet section 679.312(4)'s filing re-
quirements. Instead, the court chose to limit that priority to the
debtor's equity in the collateral. The court reasoned that only the
debtor's equity in the property is "after-acquired" and subject to the
earlier security interest. In the court's view, the subsequent seller
retains his interest in the property conditionally conveyed by him
to the debtor, and the prior creditor can claim priority only as to that
portion of the property already paid for by the debtor at time of default.
The court concluded that no conflicting security interests exist as
to portions of the property for which payment has not been made.21
The court supported its limitation by finding it "consistent with
contractual constitutional requirements and equitable principles. '"22
Basic to the majority opinion was a belief that it would be unjust and
illogical to grant a "windfall" to the holder of a perfected security
interest in after-acquired property by giving him priority over property
subsequently sold to the debtor by a purchase money financier merely
because the financier had failed to file within the 10-day grace period.2 3
19. Id. at 732.
20. Id.
21. 296 So. 2d at 34. The majority stated:
The debtor, while acquiring the physical property, only acquires an interest
therein under a credit sales contract; it is this interest only then which is
"after acquired" and thereby subject to the earlier security right. The remainder
is upon credit from the new creditor who often also retains title thereto.
Id. Such terminology, and the entire majority opinion, has a pre-UCC flavor. FLA.
STAT. § 672.401 (1973) provides that any retention or reservation of title by a seller
of property is limited to a reservation of a security interest. The section caption to
§ 679.202 states, "Title to collateral immaterial." Section 679.202 itself states that each
provision applies "whether title to collateral is in the secured party or in the debtor."
It is the creditor, not the debtor, who acquires only an interest in the collateral.
For further discussion of the immateriality of title under the UCC, see Evans Products
Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.2d 978 (Ore. 1966).
22. 296 So. 2d at 34.
23. Id. at 35.
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The court, however, did not specify what constitutional and equitable
principles would be violated by such a result-beyond a general men-
tion of "invidious preference," "arbitrary requirement" and "unjust
enrichment. ' ' 24 Nor did the court offer any statutory or case law support
for its conclusion.2 5
The court's failure to cite specific authority for its holding is hardly
surprising. Cases in other jurisdictions have presented factual situa-
tions and issues similar to those raised in Question II. In each one
the court held that under section 9-312(5) of the UCC a prior perfect-
ed security interest in after-acquired property has an absolute priority
over a purchase money security interest which was not filed within
the 10-day grace period of section 9-312(4). 26 No other court has
limited this priority to the debtor's equity in the collateral.
24. Id. at 34.
25. The court did cite statutory and case law in support of the windfall argument:
To give the prior creditor the seller's retained interest in such property simply
because of such seller's failure to record and to permit the original creditor to
replevin the sold equipment would be to give to such earlier creditor a windfall
not favored by the code (see § 679.108 and U.C.C. comment 19C F.S.A. 198)
contrary to established principles. Compare County of Pinellas v. Clearwater
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 214 So. 2d 525 (Fla. App.2d 1968).
296 So. 2d at 35. Comment 1 to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-108 (1966) points out that the
rule of that section "is of importance principally in insolvency proceedings under the
Federal Bankruptcy Act or state statutes which make certain transfers for antecedent
debt voidable as preferences." No voidable preferences were involved in International
Harvester. The cited case states that "[p]urchase money mortgages generally take priority
over any other prior or subsequent claims or liens attaching to the property through the
mortgagor." 214 So. 2d at 526. The court, however, was referring to real property, which
is specifically excluded from the UCC, see FLA. STAT. § 679.102(1) (1973), and was not in-
volved in International Harvester. Furthermore, FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (1973) requires
all mortgages of real property to be recorded to be valid, whereas International Har-
vester indicates that no filing is required to ensure priority for purchase money
security interests (i.e. purchase money mortgages in personal property).
26. See United States v. Baptist Golden Age Home, 226 F. Supp. 892 (W.D. Ark.
1964); Galleon Indus., Inc. v. Lewyn Mach. Co., 279 So. 2d 137 (Ala. Civ. App. 1973);
Cain v. Country Club Delicatessen, Inc., 203 A.2d 441 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1964); Bank
of Madison v. Tri-County Livestock Auction Co., 182 S.E.2d 687 (Ga. Ct. App.
1971); Hillman's Equip., Inc. v. Central Realty, Inc., 242 N.E.2d 522 (Ind. App. Ct.
1968); National Cash Register Co. v. Firestone Co., 191 N.E.2d 471 (Mass. 1963); James
Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 194 N.W.2d 775 (Minn. 1972); North Platte State
Bank v. Production Credit Ass'n, 200 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1972); General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Lumbercraft East, Inc., 1973 N.Y.L.J. July 12, 1973, p. 9 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1973);
National Cash Register Co. v. Miskin's 125th St., Inc., 317 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Sup. Ct. 1970);
Sunshine v. Sanray Floor Covering Corp., 315 N.Y.S.2d 937 (Sup. Ct. 1970); American
Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. National Cash Register Co., 473 P.2d 234 (Okla. 1970);
Wilson v. Burrows, 497 P.2d 240 (Utah 1972); Burlington Nat'l Bank v. Strauss, 184
N.W.2d 122 (Wis. 1971).
Appellate courts in two other jurisdictions have indicated agreement with these
holdings in dicta. Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26 (Ky. 1968);
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The Supreme Court of Nebraska, for instance, stressed the im-
portance of upholding the system of priorities created by the UCC in
North Platte State Bank v. Production Credit Association.2 7 In that case,
Production Credit Association (PCA) had advanced funds to the debtor
on an operating loan which could be renewed annually. PCA filed a
financing statement concerning the contemporaneously executed se-
curity agreement, which contained an after-acquired property clause
applicable to livestock. Subsequently, the debtor contracted with a
seller of livestock to take possession and title of Angus cattle on credit.
After the debtor had been in possession of the cattle for over a month,
he obtained the funds to pay for them by negotiating a loan from the
bank. Six days later, the bank filed a financing statement concerning the
security interest it had reserved in the cattle. When the debtor de-
faulted on the PCA note, PCA took possession of all cattle on the
debtor's ranch, including the Angus. An action was brought to deter-
mine the priority of the conflicting security interests in the Angus cattle.
The bank contended it had a purchase money security interest entitled
to priority under section 9-312(4). The Nebraska court was of the
opinion that the bank's interest was not a purchase money security
interest as defined by section 9-107 of the UCC25 because at the time it
made the loan to the debtor he already had title, possession, and all
possible rights to the cattle and therefore the loan was not used to
"acquire rights in or the use of collateral." But the court based its
holding in favor of PCA on what it considered to be a more "funda-
mental" reason: 29 even if the bank had a purchase money security
interest, it had not perfected the interest within 10 days after the
debtor had received possession of the collateral as required by section
9-312(4). The bank had filed six days after loaning the money, but
more than a month after the debtor had received possession of the
cattle. Therefore, the court applied the first-to-file rule of section
9-312(5)(a) and held that PCA was entitled to the proceeds generated
Fan-Gil Corp. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 211 N.W.2d 561 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973).
The Florida Supreme Court "acknowledged" this case law, 296 So. 2d at 35, but did
not discuss it.
27. 200 N.W.2d 1 (Neb. 1972).
28. That section provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part of its
price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obligation gives
value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of collateral if such
value is in fact so used.
UNIFORM COMMFRCIAL CODE § 9-107 (1962 version).
29. 200 N.W.2d at 6.
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from the sale of the cattle. The court noted two reasons for denying
priority to a purchase money security interest which was not filed
within the 10-day grace period:
The purchase money priority is an exception to the first to file
rule, and it should be applied only in accordance with the limita-
tions established by the Code. . . . We point out further that the
grace period, although adequate to encompass the practicalities of
the ordinary financing transaction, must necessarily be brief because
of the possibility the original first to file lender may make addition-
al advances relying upon the existence and the possession of after-
acquired property by the borrower.30
Commentators on the UCC have agreed with such a result. For
example, Professor Henson states:
If a seller or a third party advancing the funds for the purchase
of goods fails to file within ten days after the debtor receives the
goods, the purchase money priority is lost and priority will be deter-
mined according to the rules of Section 9-312(5). This will usually
mean that priority is determined in the order of filing, so that an
earlier filed financier of equipment claiming after-acquired goods
would have priority over a later purchase money financier who
did not file within ten days.31
No commentator has argued that the priority of the earlier financier
should be limited to the debtor's equity in the collateral.
The Florida court's holding thus stands alone against the unani-
mous opinion of courts and commentators that a purchase money
financier's failure to file within 10 days results in absolute priority for
a previously perfected interest in after-acquired property. To com-
pletely understand the extent of the supreme court's deviation from
the result normally reached under section 679.312(4) and (5), it is
necessary to recognize that the court's holding did more than limit or
modify the priority of the interest in after-acquired property. Chief
30. Id. at 7.
31. R. HENSON, note 14 supra, § 5-4 at 78.
White and Summers ask, "[W]hat rule governs priority if the purchase money lender
fails to comply with subsections (3) or (4) . . . ? [That case] is clearly governed by sub-
section (5) .... " J. WHITE AND R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 25-5, at 920
(1972). Gilmore observes, "The one condition for priority under § 9-312(4) is that the
purchase money interest be perfected 'at the time the debtor receives possession of the
collateral or within ten days thereafter.'" G. GILMORE, 2 SECUITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 29-5 at 799 (1965). See also Smith, Article Nine: Secured Transactions-
Perfection and Priorities, 44 N.C.L, REv. 753, 803 (1966).
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justice Carlton, in a very thorough dissent, pointed out how the
majority's decision completely reverses the priority of the creditors in
a Question II situation:
When the property is sold to satisfy the debts, the purchase money
loan is paid off first; anything left over is the debtor's equity, and
this goes to the owner of the security interest in after-acquired pro-
perty. What would have happened if the owner of the purchase
money security interest had filed it within ten days and received an
absolute priority? The result would be exactly the same!32
The court has thus given purchase money interests absolute priority
over interests in after-acquired property-whether or not the purchase
money financier has complied with the 10-day filing requirement. The
court's holding thereby detracts from the uniformity the UCC was de-
signed to foster.3 3
In defense of the court's action, it could be said that a statute
should not be construed to reach an inequitable result merely be-
cause other courts have so construed identical statutes.34 Under the
facts of International Harvester, it is arguable that to give the farm
equipment to the bank, which had not changed its position in reliance
on the debtor's apparently unencumbered ownership of the equipment,
is to -deal harshly with IHCC, whose only transgression was tardy
filing. The court stressed this aspect of the case in its opinion, 35 yet
failed to limit its holding to cases in which the prior creditor was not
misled by the failure of the subsequent creditor to record. The hold-
ing therefore raises the possibility, in future cases, of inequitable
treatment of creditors whose loans combine security interests in after-
acquired property with provisions for future advances. If a debtor
acquires new property on credit from a seller who fails to file a
financing statement, and a prior creditor makes advances relying on
32. 296 So. 2d at 44.
33. See FLA. STAT. § 671.102(2)(c) (1973).
34. However, IHCC, the assignee of the purchase money security interest, had at
least constructive knowledge that it was buying a lawsuit, a junior interest, or both.
As Chief Justice Carlton stated in dissent:
Also bearing on the equitable considerations of this case is the fact that the
petitioner who owns the purchase money security interest [IHCC] is not even the
original seller. As previously noted, the installment contract and security agree-
ment were commercially assigned to this creditor long after the ten day grace
period for filing had passed. This creditor had constructive knowledge, from the
public records of the debtor's county of residence, that there was a security in-
terest which had priority to the one it was buying.
296 So. 2d at 43.
35. Id. at 34-35.
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the apparent increase in unencumbered collateral, the prior creditor
may suffer losses merely because the seller neglected to file.3
The court's decision gives the holder of a purchase money security
interest less incentive to file a financing statement promptly, so that
the facts necessary for intelligent credit decisions by the entire creditor
community will be less likely to surface promptly, or at all. The
most significant effect of the court's modification of the UCC is likely
to be confusion and uncertainty among all creditors, especially those
who regularly combine future advances provisions with after-acquired
property clauses. A Florida creditor can no longer rely solely on the
language37 of the UCC in determining his position relative to other
creditors, but must consider the equities of the situation and ponder
the possibilities for judicial modification of the exact wording in the
UCC. As Judge Osborne of the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated in
answer to contentions that the system of priorities created by sections
9-312(4) and (5) is inequitable:
It must be remembered that the purpose of the code is to set the
rules of the road by which business decisions and practices are to
be regulated. To go outside the overall scheme of the code in a
situation where the code is unambiguous would lead to much con-
fusion in the business world. Therefore, we must reject this plea.
Once a vendor fails to take advantage of the special provisions set
out in the code for his protection, he is placed on the same footing
as any other secured party.3 8
The questions involved in International Harvester concern only
two sections of the UCC. Although the answers supplied by the Su-
preme Court of Florida detract from the uniformity sought by the fram-
ers and adopting legislatures, the inconsistencies from state to state
due to legislative modification and judicial construction are still minor.
This situation could change, however, if other courts begin to display
the willingness to alter the UCC exhibited by the Florida high court
in International Harvester.
JOSEPH E. ISSAC, III
36. See 296 So. 2d at 43 (Carlton, J., dissenting).
37. In fact, Judge Rawls felt the district court majority was "unduly emphasizing
the formalistic language" of the UCC. 269 So. 2d at 731.
38. Mammoth Cave Prod. Credit Ass'n v. York, 429 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Ky. 1968).
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